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Key Policy Messages 
•  Maize production varies widely from year to year, given Zambia’s heavy dependence on 
rainfed cultivation.  Thus consumers face wide swings in availability of their primary food staple.   
•  Typical public responses include increased food aid inflows, government commercial 
imports and stock releases, and tight controls on private sector trade.  While intended to improve 
domestic supply, these public responses can inadvertently exacerbate price instability and food 
insecurity for Zambian consumers. 
•  Two key private sector responses – private cross-border maize trade and consumer 
substitution of alternate food staples (such as cassava) for maize - can also help to moderate food 
consumption volatility.   
•  Together, private imports and increased cassava consumption could fill roughly two-thirds 
of the maize consumption shortfall facing vulnerable households during drought years. 
•  But policy changes – including more open borders and greater transparency in public import 
and pricing decisions – will be required to induce the private sector to expand imports, storage and 
production of key staples  and, in turn, improve food security for the poor consumers in Zambia. 
 
DROUGHT AND FOOD INSECURITY:   
Maize provides over half of all calories 
consumed in Zambia.   Yet dependence on 
rainfed maize production leads to highly volatile 
output from one year to the next (Figure 1).   
Given erratic rainfall, and less than 5% of 
cropped land under irrigation, Zambia’s maize 
crop fails to satisfy national consumption 
requirements, on average, in one year out of 
three.  In good harvest years, Zambia produces a 
maize surplus, enabling the country to export   
 
Figure 1. Production Trends in Food Staples 















































maize.  In bad years, when drought, reduces 
output, Zambia imports maize. 
 
Public Responses.  Typical policy responses 
during years of production shortfall include 
increased food aid flows, government 
commercial imports and stock releases, and tight 
controls on private sector trade.  
 
Two key private sector responses can also 
moderate food consumption volatility. 
 
Private imports. In drought years, open borders 
and private imports cap domestic price increases 
at import parity (Figure 2).  In contrast, under 
import bans and closed borders, maize prices 
can easily increase by 100% or more.   
 
Consumer substitution of alternate staples for 
maize.  In the event of a drought, the maize 
price rises and consumers reduce their 
consumption of maize.  At the same time, they 
reorient consumption towards more readily 
available, drought-tolerant staple foods such as 
cassava, sweet potatoes, millet and sorghum.  Of 
these, cassava is most important in Zambia, accounting for 15% of national calorie 
consumption and serving as the food staple in 
northern and northwest Zambia.   
 
Because of its drought resistance and  because 
farmers can harvest their cassava any time from 
eighteen months to three years after planting, 
Zambia’s cassava fields enable farmers to store 
food reserves in the ground, in their cassava 
fields, for up to three years.  In the event of a 
sudden fall in maize availability, farmers can 
simply harvest more cassava than they would 
have otherwise and free up maize for sale or for 
consumption by others.   
 
Figure 2 – Trends in Import Parity and 






































Lusaka wholesale price import parity
 




OBJECTIVES AND METHODS:   This 
policy brief examines the size and impact of 
public and private sector responses to drought.  
Summarizing results from a larger paper 
(Dorosh, Dradri and Haggblade, 2007), it uses 
historical data and experience from Zambia to 
assess the likely impact of maize production 
variations on the domestic maize price and on 
staple food consumption.   The analysis relies on 
a simple economic model to assess the likely 
impact of maize production shocks and private 
sector responses under alternative policy 
regimes.    
 
PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSES:  Consider 
a typical drought year, where maize production 
contracts by 30% below normal.  Using a simple 
two-commodity simulation model, Table 1 
reports the expected results under a variety of 
policy and private sector responses. 
 
Under closed borders.  For Zambia’s low-
income consumers, the worst of all worlds 
occurs when they are forced to contend with a 
production shortfall without recourse to maize 
imports which would cushion the fall in maize 
availability and the consequent increase in price.  
If Zambia were to prevent imports in the face of 
a drought – by failing to issue import permits to 
the private sector, by announcing large volumes 
of subsidized public imports and then failing to 
provide adequate funding (as in 2001), or by 
some combination of disincentives (as in 2005), 
the domestic maize price would increase by over 
160  percent.  Because poor households bear the 
brunt of this weather-induced compression in 
food availability, their maize consumption 
would fall by roughly 25%, 101 thousand tons 
below normal (Table 1, column b).   
 
Consumer substitution of cassava for maize.  
This worst-case scenario overstates the 
compression in food consumption by poor 
households, because Zambian consumers can 
fall back on alternative staple foods in situations 
where maize becomes scarce and the maize 
price spikes.  The projections from our simple 
multi-market model suggest a 160 percent 
increase in the maize price would induce 
Zambians to consume roughly an additional 43 
thousand tons of cassava (measured in dry 
weight or maize-equivalent calorie terms), thus 
offsetting about 40% of the shortfall in maize 
availability.  In the cassava-producing regions of 
northern Zambia, this substitution of cassava for 
maize would largely eliminate the vulnerable 
households’ maize deficit, freeing up maize they 
would have otherwise consumed for sale in 
other zones where consumers have developed a 
more pronounced preference for maize.  In 
calorie terms, the maize-equivalent consumption 
shortfall among poor households would fall 
from 101 thousand to 57 thousand tons (Table 1, 
column c).  
 
Free Trade.  Equally important to vulnerable 
households are private imports of maize.   
Historic price spreads between Lusaka and 
Johannesburg suggest that the private sector 
would import about 155 thousand tons of maize 
in response to a 30% maize production shortfall, 
capping the maize price increase at import 
parity, or 36 percent above normal lean-season 
levels.  The resulting shortfall in staple food 
consumption by poor households falls to 33 
thousand tons (Table 1, column d).   
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public imports (government or food aid) none none none small large small none none
Maize market impact
Net production ('000 tons) 851 596 596 596 596 596 596 596 596
Public imports (government or food aid) 0 0 0 0 50 255 50 0 0
Private imports 0 0 0 155 105 0 0 159 0
Supply 851 596 596 751 751 851 646 755 596
Price (percent change from base) 0% 163% 163% 36% 36% 8% 115% 36% 167%
Maize production (next year) 0% 34% 34% 10% 10% 2% 26% 10% 34%
National consumption of food staples ('000 tons of maize-equivalent staples)
Cassava consumption (dried weight) 285 285 364 298 298 315 352 298 365
Total maize plus cassava consumption 1,136 881 959 1,049 1,049 1,165 997 1,053 960
Change from base 0 -255 -177 -87 -87 30 -138 -82 -176
Food consumption of poor households ('000 tons of maize-equivalent staples)
Maize 408 308 308 365 365 421 330 372 312
Cassava (in maize equivalents) 178 178 221 189 189 185 212 189 222
Total maize equivalents 586 485 529 553 553 606 542 561 534
Estimated change in staple consumption
poor northern households 0 -47 -5 -9 -9 10 -4 -9 -5
poor southern households 0 -54 -52 -23 -23 9 -40 -16 -47
total poor households 0 -101 -57 -33 -33 20 -44 -25 -52
Source: Dorosh, Dradri and Haggblade (2007).






Small volumes.  If food aid agencies or the 
Zambian government were to import small 
volumes of maize to sell domestically at market 
price -- where small is defined as any amount 
less than the 155 thousand tons the private 
sector would bring in at import parity prices -- 
the results would be the same as under free trade 
(Table 1, columns d and e).  In this situation, 
public imports would simply displace an 
equivalent volume of private imports.   
 
For this combination of side-by-side public and 
private imports to occur, however, the private 
sector needs to have confidence that public food 
managers will operate under transparent, 
predictable decision rules governing quantities, 
timing and release prices.  The private sector 
needs to have confidence that government will 
not sell imported grain at below-market prices, 
as the FRA did in 2005, causing commercial 
losses for private importers (Mwanaumo et al., 
2005).  Government, likewise, needs to have 
confidence that private importers will not 
collude to artificially boost import prices above 
import parity.  To develop this mutual trust will 
require good communications and good will on 
both sides.   
  
Large public imports.  If government or food 
aid agencies bring in maize volumes in excess of 
what consumers would purchase at import 
parity, these large-scale public imports will 
drive domestic prices down below import parity.  
Using historical averages, public imports of 255 
thousand tons (the maize supply gap projected in 
column b) would bring down prices below the 
$311 import parity level to $247 per ton, 
resulting in government trading losses of $64 
per ton and a maize price only 8  percent above 
normal, in spite of the drought.  While 
benefiting local maize consumers, this would 
dampen farmers’ production response for the 
coming year from 10 percent to 2 percent (Table 
1, column f).   
  
Private imports impeded.   Given late and 
unpredictable decision-making by Zambian 
authorities, many private firms have become 
 
3wary of cross-border maize trade. Simulation 1h 
considers a scenario, similar to 2001, in which 
government announces that it will tender for the 
import of large volumes of subsidized maize, 
thus scaring off the commercial private trade 
(Nijhoff et al., 2002).  Then, due to a shortage of 
funds or to management difficulties, government 
ends up bringing in less maize than they 
intended.  If government were to announce they 
would import 255 thousand tons of maize (as in 
simulation 4g), thus scaring away private 
traders, but then import only 50 thousand tons, 
then maize prices would more than double and 
staple food consumption (of maize and cassava) 
by low-income consumers would fall 44 
thousand tons below normal and 111 thousand 
tons below the free trade level (Table 1, columns 
d and g).   
 
TARGETED INCOME TRANSFERS:  
 
Under free trade.  Both food aid agencies and 
the Zambian government have experimented 
with temporary employment schemes and cash 
transfers aimed at increasing the purchasing 
power of vulnerable households during drought 
years.  The last two columns of Table 1 estimate 
the impact of a cash transfer equal to 5 percent 
of annual household income, targeted at low-
income households in southern Zambia, at a cost 
of roughly $74 million.  Under free trade, this 
increased purchasing power would reduce the 
deficit in food staple consumption among 
vulnerable households from 33 thousand to 25 
thousand tons, for a gain of 8 thousand tons 
(Table 1, column i).   
  
With closed borders.  Under closed borders, 
however, this income transfer would accomplish 
very little, other than a minor redistribution of 
purchasing power.  Because wealthy households 
can outbid the poor, the net impact on maize 
consumption by vulnerable households becomes 
very small.  Their food staple deficit jumps to 52 
thousand tons, only a 5 thousand ton 
improvement over the autarky solution (Table 4, 
columns d and j).  With no additional food 
supplies to purchase, poor households, even 
with additional disposable income, find 
themselves competing against the wealthy for 
the limited available food supplies.  As a result, 
income transfer programs are of little use unless 
free trade, or public food imports, enable 
available supply to increase along with 
consumer spending power.   
 
CONCLUSIONS:  Maize imports -  Open 
borders offer a financially inexpensive means of 
reducing the domestic price volatility of staple 
foods.  The alternative policy of closing borders 
can easily lead to price volatility in the range of 
100 percent from one year to the next.   
Moreover, common government interventions – 
such as export and import quotas and price 
subsidies – may inadvertently accentuate 
domestic price volatility.  Uncertainties over 
government intentions about trade volumes, 
tariffs and pricing risk driving commercial 
traders out of the market, thereby exacerbating 
price fluctuations.   
 
Substitution among food staples - Drought-
tolerant staples such as sorghum, millet, sweet 
potatoes and cassava allow consumers to 
substitute these foods for maize in response to 
highly variable maize availability. As an 
indicative order of magnitude, our projections 
suggest that, together, open borders and 
consumer substitution of cassava for maize 
could absorb roughly two-thirds of the 
consumption shock to vulnerable households 
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